Megatrend 1: The distribution of photovoltaic industry tends to be dispersed rather than monopolizing. In the large-scale fluctuation of this photovoltaic industry, the subsidy for photovoltaic power generation is a policy factor, and the price of solar cells caused by economic crisis, technological progress and capacity expansion The decline is a market factor. The combination of these two factors makes the solar power industry different from other industries that are completely controlled by the laws of the market economy, and is also different from some industries that are completely controlled by policies (such as coal). The business model of a company that grows in this special environment is also very special, and it is constantly undergoing tremendous changes. Let us first look at the overall changes in the world's photovoltaic companies in recent years. We compared the world's top 10 PV manufacturers' share of the world market from 2005 to 2010. From this, we can surprisingly find two big changes: First, the market share of the world's top ten PV companies is very large. In 2005, the world's top ten PV companies accounted for 72.8% of the market share. In 2010, it only accounted for 39.8%. Second, the difference in the market share of the top ten PV companies is also shrinking. In 2005, Sharp, the largest PV company in Japan, accounted for 24% of the world's production, while the last SolarWord only accounted for 2%. The difference between the two is 12 times. In 2010, First Solar, the world's largest company, had a market share of 5.8%. The last Taiwanese Gintech had a market share of 2.4%, which was less than 2.4 times. We will plot the changes in the market share of the world's top ten PV companies from 2005 to 2010. It can be seen that the market share of the top ten PV companies has been decreasing year by year, but it has gradually slowed down in the past three years. Such a phenomenon indicates that while the scale of the entire photovoltaic industry is gradually expanding, competition has become more complete and monopoly has been waning. From another point of view, this phenomenon shows that after a single PV company expands to a certain extent, the difficulty becomes very large. Therefore, it is difficult for these enterprises to further expand the scale after reaching a capacity level. The scale gap between enterprises is getting smaller and smaller, and the proportion in the total scale is gradually shrinking.
So why is this happening? We believe that its syndrome is due to the volatility of the photovoltaic market.
The scale of solar cell manufacturers is expanding, with annual sales exceeding 10 billion yuan. The amount of liquidity required for such large production is huge, but such a large amount of sales is a very single product, and the final shipment is the sun. Battery components, the market is relatively single, so such large sales are controlled by the laws of a single market. Once the European PV market fluctuates, the company as a whole will be stalled, and once the inventory is increased due to poor market, the funds cannot be returned. Businesses will have a hard time coping. And the bigger the company, the harder it is to support. In 2010, the world's second-largest photovoltaic output was Wuxi Suntech's output of 1585MW. According to the 2010 average sales price of about 15 yuan per watt, the annual output was about 23.8 billion yuan, which requires a monthly output of 1.98 billion yuan. Sudden changes in the market, poor sales, like the sudden changes in the European market, resulting in a backlog of Chinese products, then it is difficult for companies to support such a huge demand for funds, even if they can borrow from banks, the financial costs are surprisingly large. According to reports, JAA will expand its production capacity to 3GW in 2011, and we believe its risk is quite huge. If calculated at RMB 12 per watt, the annual output will be RMB 36 billion, and the monthly output value will reach RMB 3 billion. If there is a problem with the market or the supply of silicon materials, the financial situation of the company will deteriorate rapidly.
Throughout the market in 2004, the photovoltaic industry has always developed in various fluctuations. At the beginning, the market was very good, but the supply of silicon materials was not smooth, and enterprises had to pay in advance; after the economic crisis, the market had problems. Economic crises and policy changes have made industry fluctuations the norm, which makes it difficult for companies to do very large. According to the general economic law, people always think that the larger the enterprise, the greater the ability to resist risks. However, the particularity of the current solar cell manufacturing industry determines that such a rule may not necessarily apply. The photovoltaic market in Europe has experienced a sharp downward trend. Many people think that industry reshuffle will occur. Many small businesses will close down, and large enterprises are the ultimate winners. The author believes that the collapse of many small enterprises will become a reality, but the losses of large enterprises will be even more arduous. Although large enterprises will not go bankrupt, the industrial pattern we see after the crisis will be further dispersed, and industry competition. Will be more fully. Megatrends 2. The impact of fluctuations in the photovoltaic industry on Chinese business models This situation has made the entire Chinese PV company have to think about its own business model. The business model of expanding production scale in 2010 will be tested. In the second phase of China's PV industry from 2004 to 2008, it experienced the first high-speed development period of China's PV industry. In this high-speed development period, there have been myths such as Wuxi Suntech and Jiangxi LDK. The main mode of the business enterprises at that time was to make huge profits by using the huge gap between the long-sell price and the spot price formed by the shortage of silicon materials. However, this long-term silicon bill requires a lot of money, so many companies use stock market financing to use the funds to sign long-term silicon bills, and then use the price advantage of long-single silicon materials to earn high profits, and then expand production. To enable enterprises to develop rapidly. This model seems to be a basic model for the rapid expansion of many companies at the time. However, the economic crisis that broke out at the end of 2008 caused the speculators of these disguised silicon futures to be in trouble. The price of the long list signed was even higher than the spot price, and the silicon material obtained according to the order became an inventory backlog. The so-called "Cheng Xiao Xiao He, defeat also Xiao He." Many large PV manufacturers have suffered huge losses. In this way, the history of silicon material futures speculation was completely over in the economic crisis. From the silicon as the king to the cash to the king, the market is king.
In the second wave of high-speed expansion in 2010, faced with huge market demand, people found that solar cell production capacity is not enough, how much product is produced. Therefore, a large amount of funds have entered the photovoltaic industry. The investment is very active. But even if the market and downstream production capacity expand rapidly, silicon materials can not reproduce several times the spot market price. At this time, people seem to have formed another industrial model, which is to expand the scale of photovoltaic cell production lines, and people have hundreds of megawatts of upper battery lines. Several major battery manufacturers have announced that they will expand to 2~4GW in 2011. The huge capital required for the expansion of the photovoltaic industry is also obtained from the stock market, banks and so on. Due to the rapid expansion of these companies, a huge scale has been formed. However, at this stage, there is no huge profit margin formed by the "two-track system of silicon material prices." The company's profits are more from the fineness of the company's internal management, as well as the grasp of the market and the pace of silicon materials. At this stage, many companies have successfully listed in the country, thus rapidly becoming rich. However, the downward fluctuation of the European PV market has had a huge impact on the business model of these companies. The larger the scale, the more serious the product backlog and the tighter the capital chain. If the crisis lasts for a long time, the capital chains of these large enterprises will be too tight and the possibility of breakage will increase greatly.
Megatrend 3: Industry shifts to developing Asia According to the statistics of Photon International's third issue in 2011, China accounted for 47.8% of 2011, accounting for 1,3018.4MW; Taiwan accounted for 12.7%, accounting for 3448.5MW; the total of the two places: 60.5%, It is 16466.9MW, and in 2010 the total of the two places was 50.2%. Looking at the entire Asian region, Japan accounted for 8.5%, accounting for 2299.5MW; Malaysia accounted for 5.2%, accounting for 1406.5MW; South Korea accounted for 3.2%, accounting for 865MW; Asia's remaining accounted for 4.9%, accounting for 1341.8MW. Total Asia accounted for 82.3% of global production, accounting for 2,2379.7 MW, compared with 75.7% in 2009. If we compare the data of previous years, it is more obvious that the manufacturing center of the entire photovoltaic industry is clearly shifting to the Asian region, especially to China and Taiwan. The reason, in addition to the traditional saying, includes: low labor costs and low resource costs. We also see two factors: Chinese companies are significantly faster in decision-making and action than Western countries. A solar cell production line often takes only 7 to 9 months from decision-making to construction to commissioning, while European and American countries tend to It takes a year and a half. On the other hand, the amount of money invested in the photovoltaic industry in China this year is very large, which has also contributed to the rapid growth of China's photovoltaic industry.
Megatrend 4: Crystal silicon solar cell production expansion is significantly faster than thin film solar cell production expansion Reporter surveyed the changes in the proportion of various industrialized solar cells in the world's photovoltaic industry from 1999 to 2010. It can be seen that before 2004, the output of thin film batteries continued to decline, mainly due to the maturity of the crystalline silicon solar cell industry and the decline in the cost of crystalline silicon solar cells. Since 2004 and 2009, the share of thin-film silicon solar cells is growing, mainly due to the rapid expansion of the crystalline silicon solar cell industry, resulting in a shortage of silicon materials, so the price of crystalline silicon solar cells continues to rise, thus making the price of thin-film batteries Shows a clear competitive advantage. In particular, the rapid growth of thin-film solar cells in 2008 and 2009 was mainly due to the successful mass production of low-cost CdTe solar cells from First Solar of the United States, resulting in a significant increase in the proportion of thin-film cells. However, in 2010, the proportion of crystalline silicon solar cells rebounded sharply. The reason is mainly that after the economic crisis, the shortage of silicon materials has been solved, the price of silicon materials has dropped drastically, and other technological advances to improve the efficiency of crystalline silicon solar cells have caused the price of crystalline silicon solar cells to drop drastically. As a result, the market share of crystalline silicon solar cells has increased significantly. Whether the future thin film battery can quickly increase the market share, the key depends on the technological maturity of the thin film battery, the decline in equipment prices, and the improvement of efficiency.
So why is this happening? We believe that its syndrome is due to the volatility of the photovoltaic market.
The scale of solar cell manufacturers is expanding, with annual sales exceeding 10 billion yuan. The amount of liquidity required for such large production is huge, but such a large amount of sales is a very single product, and the final shipment is the sun. Battery components, the market is relatively single, so such large sales are controlled by the laws of a single market. Once the European PV market fluctuates, the company as a whole will be stalled, and once the inventory is increased due to poor market, the funds cannot be returned. Businesses will have a hard time coping. And the bigger the company, the harder it is to support. In 2010, the world's second-largest photovoltaic output was Wuxi Suntech's output of 1585MW. According to the 2010 average sales price of about 15 yuan per watt, the annual output was about 23.8 billion yuan, which requires a monthly output of 1.98 billion yuan. Sudden changes in the market, poor sales, like the sudden changes in the European market, resulting in a backlog of Chinese products, then it is difficult for companies to support such a huge demand for funds, even if they can borrow from banks, the financial costs are surprisingly large. According to reports, JAA will expand its production capacity to 3GW in 2011, and we believe its risk is quite huge. If calculated at RMB 12 per watt, the annual output will be RMB 36 billion, and the monthly output value will reach RMB 3 billion. If there is a problem with the market or the supply of silicon materials, the financial situation of the company will deteriorate rapidly.
Throughout the market in 2004, the photovoltaic industry has always developed in various fluctuations. At the beginning, the market was very good, but the supply of silicon materials was not smooth, and enterprises had to pay in advance; after the economic crisis, the market had problems. Economic crises and policy changes have made industry fluctuations the norm, which makes it difficult for companies to do very large. According to the general economic law, people always think that the larger the enterprise, the greater the ability to resist risks. However, the particularity of the current solar cell manufacturing industry determines that such a rule may not necessarily apply. The photovoltaic market in Europe has experienced a sharp downward trend. Many people think that industry reshuffle will occur. Many small businesses will close down, and large enterprises are the ultimate winners. The author believes that the collapse of many small enterprises will become a reality, but the losses of large enterprises will be even more arduous. Although large enterprises will not go bankrupt, the industrial pattern we see after the crisis will be further dispersed, and industry competition. Will be more fully. Megatrends 2. The impact of fluctuations in the photovoltaic industry on Chinese business models This situation has made the entire Chinese PV company have to think about its own business model. The business model of expanding production scale in 2010 will be tested. In the second phase of China's PV industry from 2004 to 2008, it experienced the first high-speed development period of China's PV industry. In this high-speed development period, there have been myths such as Wuxi Suntech and Jiangxi LDK. The main mode of the business enterprises at that time was to make huge profits by using the huge gap between the long-sell price and the spot price formed by the shortage of silicon materials. However, this long-term silicon bill requires a lot of money, so many companies use stock market financing to use the funds to sign long-term silicon bills, and then use the price advantage of long-single silicon materials to earn high profits, and then expand production. To enable enterprises to develop rapidly. This model seems to be a basic model for the rapid expansion of many companies at the time. However, the economic crisis that broke out at the end of 2008 caused the speculators of these disguised silicon futures to be in trouble. The price of the long list signed was even higher than the spot price, and the silicon material obtained according to the order became an inventory backlog. The so-called "Cheng Xiao Xiao He, defeat also Xiao He." Many large PV manufacturers have suffered huge losses. In this way, the history of silicon material futures speculation was completely over in the economic crisis. From the silicon as the king to the cash to the king, the market is king.
In the second wave of high-speed expansion in 2010, faced with huge market demand, people found that solar cell production capacity is not enough, how much product is produced. Therefore, a large amount of funds have entered the photovoltaic industry. The investment is very active. But even if the market and downstream production capacity expand rapidly, silicon materials can not reproduce several times the spot market price. At this time, people seem to have formed another industrial model, which is to expand the scale of photovoltaic cell production lines, and people have hundreds of megawatts of upper battery lines. Several major battery manufacturers have announced that they will expand to 2~4GW in 2011. The huge capital required for the expansion of the photovoltaic industry is also obtained from the stock market, banks and so on. Due to the rapid expansion of these companies, a huge scale has been formed. However, at this stage, there is no huge profit margin formed by the "two-track system of silicon material prices." The company's profits are more from the fineness of the company's internal management, as well as the grasp of the market and the pace of silicon materials. At this stage, many companies have successfully listed in the country, thus rapidly becoming rich. However, the downward fluctuation of the European PV market has had a huge impact on the business model of these companies. The larger the scale, the more serious the product backlog and the tighter the capital chain. If the crisis lasts for a long time, the capital chains of these large enterprises will be too tight and the possibility of breakage will increase greatly.
Megatrend 3: Industry shifts to developing Asia According to the statistics of Photon International's third issue in 2011, China accounted for 47.8% of 2011, accounting for 1,3018.4MW; Taiwan accounted for 12.7%, accounting for 3448.5MW; the total of the two places: 60.5%, It is 16466.9MW, and in 2010 the total of the two places was 50.2%. Looking at the entire Asian region, Japan accounted for 8.5%, accounting for 2299.5MW; Malaysia accounted for 5.2%, accounting for 1406.5MW; South Korea accounted for 3.2%, accounting for 865MW; Asia's remaining accounted for 4.9%, accounting for 1341.8MW. Total Asia accounted for 82.3% of global production, accounting for 2,2379.7 MW, compared with 75.7% in 2009. If we compare the data of previous years, it is more obvious that the manufacturing center of the entire photovoltaic industry is clearly shifting to the Asian region, especially to China and Taiwan. The reason, in addition to the traditional saying, includes: low labor costs and low resource costs. We also see two factors: Chinese companies are significantly faster in decision-making and action than Western countries. A solar cell production line often takes only 7 to 9 months from decision-making to construction to commissioning, while European and American countries tend to It takes a year and a half. On the other hand, the amount of money invested in the photovoltaic industry in China this year is very large, which has also contributed to the rapid growth of China's photovoltaic industry.
Megatrend 4: Crystal silicon solar cell production expansion is significantly faster than thin film solar cell production expansion Reporter surveyed the changes in the proportion of various industrialized solar cells in the world's photovoltaic industry from 1999 to 2010. It can be seen that before 2004, the output of thin film batteries continued to decline, mainly due to the maturity of the crystalline silicon solar cell industry and the decline in the cost of crystalline silicon solar cells. Since 2004 and 2009, the share of thin-film silicon solar cells is growing, mainly due to the rapid expansion of the crystalline silicon solar cell industry, resulting in a shortage of silicon materials, so the price of crystalline silicon solar cells continues to rise, thus making the price of thin-film batteries Shows a clear competitive advantage. In particular, the rapid growth of thin-film solar cells in 2008 and 2009 was mainly due to the successful mass production of low-cost CdTe solar cells from First Solar of the United States, resulting in a significant increase in the proportion of thin-film cells. However, in 2010, the proportion of crystalline silicon solar cells rebounded sharply. The reason is mainly that after the economic crisis, the shortage of silicon materials has been solved, the price of silicon materials has dropped drastically, and other technological advances to improve the efficiency of crystalline silicon solar cells have caused the price of crystalline silicon solar cells to drop drastically. As a result, the market share of crystalline silicon solar cells has increased significantly. Whether the future thin film battery can quickly increase the market share, the key depends on the technological maturity of the thin film battery, the decline in equipment prices, and the improvement of efficiency.
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